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Anna SFARD, Haifa 
Metaphors in mathematical thinking and in research on 
mathematical thinking: a prop or a trap? 
When Rainer Maria Rilke spoke about the “geflügelte Entzücken” 
(“winged energy of delight”) or the “frühen Abgrund” (“first abysses” of 
childhood) (Rilke, 1956, 157), he was helping himself with the poets’ fa-
vorite device known as metaphor. The use of this special linguistic form, 
although usually associated with literary context, far exceeds the bounda-
ries of literature and poetry. Scientists are probably as frequent users of 
metaphors as poets, except that they try to conceal this fact by pushing the 
tropes into the straitjacket of formal definitions. In this way, they deprive 
the metaphor of this one feature that poets find most endearing: ambiguity. 
For instance, geneticists use metaphors when they speak about messenger 
RNA, as do physicists when they mention chain reaction.  
In this paper, I reflect on the role of metaphors in two inter-related do-
mains: that of creative mathematical thinking and that of research on math-
ematical thinking. In particular, I aim to show that metaphors shape our 
thinking, either mathematical or meta-mathematical, and through thinking, 
they mold our decisions and actions. The focus of these reflections is on 
one ubiquitous and particularly consequential type of metaphor that can be 
called metaphor-of-object or MofO, for short. I am guided by the question 
of MofO's relative strengths and weaknesses. I begin with stressing the all-
important constructive role of MofO in the development of mathematics. 
Later, while reflecting on the way the same metaphor functions in mathe-
matics education research, I give special attention to those of its uses that 
are potentially harmful. I conclude with an attempt to answer the question 
of how to utilize metaphors in both mathematics education research and in 
teaching, so as to make sure they serve as props rather than traps. 
1. The metaphor of object in mathematical thinking 
Metaphor 
The word metaphor, a combination of the Greek terms meta, which is 
equivalent to trans or beyond, with phrein – to carry, was first defined by 
Aristotle as calling something by a name that belongs to something else. 
While I agree that metaphor is a linguistic device, I prefer a definition that 
relates it to language in use, that is, to discourse: we encounter a metaphor 
wherever parts of a familiar discourse are used in conjunction with another, 
seemingly unrelated one. Thus, when we begin speaking about messenger 
RNA, we relate the "source" discourse about carrying telegrams or letters, 
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which is what messengers traditionally do, to the "target" discourse of ge-
netics, which is not about people or their actions, but rather about organ-
isms and the ways they develop. When the metaphor comes into being, the 
resulting change in the target discourse involves much more than addition 
of the word messenger. Together with this single old term, utterances mod-
eled on those about human messengers begin appearing in the relatively 
new discourse of genetics. This is the first evidence for the utmost im-
portance of metaphor as a discursive device. As I will be arguing all along 
this talk, metaphors create new discourses rather than just embellishing ex-
isting ones, and as such, they shape our thinking, and through our thinking 
they impact almost anything we do (i.e. Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).  
Metaphor of object 
One type of metaphor, which we encounter literally everywhere, hides in 
expressions with which we are so familiar that we are unlikely to notice 
their metaphorical nature. Consider, for instance, such terms as falling in 
love, acquiring knowledge, transferring learning, crystallizing ideas, build-
ing meaning or decomposing numbers. Although coming from different 
domains, all these abstract notions have one common feature: because of 
their being preceded by words such as falling into, acquiring, crystallizing, 
building and decomposing, they all sound as is if they were signifying 
physical objects. Once we become aware of our tendency to think in terms 
of objects, we start noticing the metaphor of object literally everywhere. 
Wherever we go, we hear people and ourselves speaking about entities, ei-
ther concrete or abstract; and this is true, in particular, in research discours-
es. To give just a few examples, let me mention such nous as energy, force 
or number, which we use in the so called "exact" sciences, and the terms 
knowledge, concept, meaning, belief, attitude, value, personality, ability, 
gift, ego, superego that populate our talk about humans. I am aware that 
calling all these notions metaphors may sound, at first, somewhat implausi-
ble, if only because none of these words seems to have an alternative that 
could be regarded as its "literal" version. In the next two sections devoted, 
respectively, to mathematical thinking and to thinking about mathematical 
thinking, I will support this claim with some additional arguments. Special 
effort will be invested in showing the metaphorical origins of the concept 
of number.  
Before doing this, let me remark on the mechanism of objectification 
through which metaphor of object comes into being. Objectifying may be 
described as a discursive process of introducing new nouns and using them 
as if they signified self-sustained, discourse-independent object. This pro-
cess involves two discursive moves: reification, that is replacing talk about 
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process (using verbs) into talk on things (using nouns); and alienation, that 
is, removal of the human performer of the process. See, for instance, the 
two cases presented in Table 1. In the first example, which comes from 
mathematical discourse, the transition is from the talk about an operation to 
the talk about its product; in the second case, taken from the discourse on 
people doing mathematics, the move is from talk about properties of human 
action to talk about properties of the actor.  
 
Mathematical 
discourse 
Operation  product 
If I extract a square root from x and raise the result to 
the third power, I get the same result as when I raise x 
to the 3rd power and extract square root from it 
 The 3rd power of 
square root equals 
square root of the 3rd 
Discourse 
about doing 
mathematics 
property of action  property of actor 
John often solves difficult mathematical problems and 
always passes test with flying colors 
 John has a gift for 
mathematics 
 
Table 1: Examples of objectifying in mathematics and in research on mathematical thinking 
 
2. Metaphor of object in mathematical thinking  
Example: Number as metaphor 
The claim that number is but a metaphor may sound unlilely. The reified 
and alienated way we speak about numbers, and the fact that talk on num-
bers is governed by strict rules that no person can change makes us con-
vinced that while mentioning, say “number five” we refer to an object that 
exists in the world independently of our thoughts or will, just like stars and 
animals. The fact that contrary to the latter, this thing called five is not ac-
cessible through our senses does not undermine our belief in its independ-
ent existence. Still, why is it that when we take a look at pictures as differ-
ent as the fingers of one hand, the famous building called Pentagon and the 
American coin called “nickel”, we are tempted to claim that something is 
“the same” in all of them? What is it in these pictures that makes us see 
“sameness”? One can say that in each of these pictures, she can “see” num-
ber five. But what is this number five? In fact, we cannot see, smell or 
touch it! A similar query with regard to another set of pictures, say, a set of 
photographs of yourself from different times of your life and possibly quite 
dissimilar to one another, is much easier to answer: The same object (per-
son) is shown in all them. Back to the first set, we do not find any concrete 
object behind the pictures and, after some additional reflection we are 
compelled to admit that the common property is different: It is the fact that 
if we count the elements of the set, we end with the same number word 
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(five) in all three cases. Thus, if the common property of the photographs is 
the object that features in all of them, the common property of the other set 
is a certain process – process of counting. If so, why do we speak about 
both sets of pictures as if they were presenting objects? This way of speak-
ing makes us able to build on what we are familiar with: concrete objects 
and processes involving such objects. This, in turn, makes us feel we un-
derstand things better. Indeed, thinking in terms of “the same object” about 
the processes that underlay the equivalence of the fingers of one hand, the 
Pentagon and the nickel helps us to account for the fact that we view these 
three things as in some sense “the same” in spite of the fact that they do not 
look as having anything in common. Below, I argue that using number 
words as referring to objects has another extremely important advantage: It 
makes us able to say more with less, thus making our discourses more con-
cise and more likely to develop even further.  
MofO in mathematical thinking as a prop 
To objectify number means to start using number words within language 
structures originally devised for the talk about objects. It is thanks to this 
kind of use that we can create the brief expression “three multiplied by five 
is fifteen”, which in its symbolic form, 5 · 3 = 15, becomes even briefer. 
Here, indeed, the words five, three and fifteen are used as if they signified 
things, two of which combine together to give the third. As long as number 
words remain unobjectified, the general fact expressed as 5 · 3 = 15 would 
have to be stated in so many words: If I have five sets of objects such that 
when I count the elements of any of these five sets I stop at the word three, 
then when I put these five sets together and count the elements of the result-
ing big set, I finish with the word fifteen.  
This shows how the act of objectifying compresses the discourse, and thus 
increases its manageability. In metaphorical terms, mathematical objects 
function as compact black boxes which we may conveniently use without 
bothering about their complex, densely packed interiors. It is now possible 
to manipulate the newly constructed mathematical objects and combine 
them together – something that would have been a very awkward thing to 
do as long as the processes that gave rise to these objects have not under-
gone objectification. One can say that MofOs are the “whipping boys of 
mathematics”: they take the “punishment” of complexity on themselves, 
leaving us free to enjoy the simple and elegant sides of mathematics.  
It is also because of this newly attained manageability that mathematicians 
may now look at the existing numerical discourse “from above”, searching 
for its characteristic patterns. They may be intrigued by, say, the operation 
of squaring numbers. Soon, the explorers will be objectifying this pro-
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ceedure, and perhaps presenting it with the help of the brief algebraic for-
mula x2. The objectified operation of squaring will eventually be baptized 
with the new name quadratic function and will become subject to new op-
erations and new complex processes.  
What was presented here will repeat itself time and again: processes on al-
ready existing mathematical objects will be objectified and then operated 
upon. The new process, involving the newly created objects will be objecti-
fied again, giving raise to yet another extension of mathematical discourse. 
All this will repeat itself over and over again. It is therefore the metaphor of 
object that fuels the development of mathematical discourse (Sfard, 1994; 
Lakoff & Núñez, 2000). One can say that mathematics owes this metaphor 
its very existence, no less!  
MofO in mathematical thinking as a trap  
One generally acknowledged downside of metaphors is that they often 
bring with them undesirable entailments. This is what happens when we 
automatically ascribe a property of the source object to the one that consti-
tutes the target. Thus, for instance, the students tend to interpret the math-
ematical term limit as referring to what mathematicians call the upper 
bond: they wrongly believe that a sequence cannot, at any point, transcend 
its limit. Clearly, this belief is fed by such everyday uses of the word as the 
one we make while speaking about speed limit or when stating emphatical-
ly, “My patience has its limit!”.  
Another MofOs-related problem, probably more difficult to deal with, 
stems from the counterintuitive nature of the idea of viewing a process as 
its own product. Indeed, defining the basic complex number i as “the 
square root of –1” may be seen as improbably as the claim that a cake is the 
same as the recipe according to which it is made. Moreover, to construct a 
new object, one must fulfill an inherently circular pair of requirements: On 
the one hand, to bring this object into being and start getting acquainted 
with its properties, one has to engage in a conversation about it; on the oth-
er hand, how can one talk about an object before she knows anything about 
it and is not even aware of its existence? Many of those who lag behind 
others in their mathematical development, possibly also suffering from 
acute mathematical anxiety, may be the victims of this paradox.  
3. Metaphor of object in thinking about mathematical thinking  
In this part, I turn to the role of metaphor of object in discourses in which 
we engage while doing research on mathematical thinking. After showing 
some examples, I will claim that the risks of MofOs in the talk about peo-
ple may exceed their gains.  
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Examples: MofOs in discourses on thinking 
In the previous part of this paper, I made an effort to show the omnipres-
ence of MofOs in mathematical thinking. The examples in Table 2 make us 
realize how common this metaphor is also in our thinking about thinking. 
At a closer look we realize that literally every statement on processes – on 
what people do (think, see, deal, fail) – can be replaced with an allegedly 
equivalent statement on objects – what people have (ideas, concepts, dis-
caclulia).  
 
Talk about processes  Talk about objects 
The student has always been dealing successfully with tasks involving 
functions 
 The student acquired 
the concept of function 
She has been always been failing in dealing with numerical tasks  She has dyscalculia 
 
Table 2: Examples of objectification in our discourses about mathematical thinking 
 
MofO in thinking about mathematical thinking as a prop 
Although MofOs are as beneficial in the discourse on mathematical think-
ing as they are in mathematical discourse with regard to the economy of 
speech (see Table 2), I now wish to point out the price we pay for replacing 
the talk about what people do with statements about what they we have.  
MofO in thinking about mathematical thinking as a trap  
Those who use the metaphor of object in the talk about people face at least 
three types of dangers. First, the MofOs may lead to ambiguities and, at the 
same time, create a misleading impression of clarity; second, some meta-
phorical entailments may induce decisions that harm the learners of math-
ematics rather than helping them; and third, the unacknowledged ambigui-
ties may lead to faulty reasoning and to logical fallacies. Let me elaborate 
on each of these claims. 
Ambiguity is the inherent property of metaphors, which, although greatly 
appreciated by poets, makes scientists suspicious. The researcher’s wari-
ness is fully understandable: when used without necessary precautions, the 
non-operationalized metaphors may lead to controversies that appear to be 
disagreements about facts, while being in reality the result of differing uses 
of words. For instance, the long-standing controversies around Piaget’s fa-
mous number-conservation task may be explained by the fact that the cen-
tral idea of “having the concept of number” has never been defined in oper-
ational terms and that different interpreters probably did not mean the same 
thing while talking about children’s numerical thinking (Sfard, 2008).  
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To illustrate the dangers that come with uncontrolled metaphorical entail-
ments, let me use the example of the talk about learning disability. We are 
tempted to use these words whenever we face a child who has a long histo-
ry of poor scholarly performance. Succumbing to the urge for objectifica-
tion, we begin speaking in nouns and adjectives that indicate a property of 
the learner (learning disability, LD); this, as opposed to using verbs and 
adverbs that would make us focus on properties of the learners’ actions 
(performs poorly). Without realizing, we also start being guided by the im-
plicit message of the objectified talk: properties of a person, unlike those of 
her actions, are more likely to be given by nature than shaped by people; 
are general rather than context-dependent; and are permanent rather than 
transient. This view of the student’s difficulty may to lead to consequential 
decisions: we are likely to direct those with “learning disability” to a sepa-
rate life trajectory where there is little chance for them to further their 
mathematical education. In this way, our talk about LD becomes self-
fulfilling prophecy: we create the reality rather than just reacting to it.  
The last noteworthy consequence of objectifying is faulty reasoning ex-
pressing itself, among others, in our phony explanations of the observed 
phenomena. Think about the way we diagnose dyscalculia. To do so, we 
observe the student’s performance on certain numerical tasks. If the per-
formance is disappointing, we often conclude that the child “has” discal-
culia. From now on, we will use this “fact” to explain her inadequate nu-
merical skills. At a closer look, however, this explanation is circular. While 
diagnosing, we stated: “poor performance, therefore dyscalculia”. Later, 
while “explaining”, we said “dyscalculia, therefore poor performance”. The 
cause and effect exchanged their roles. In today’s reality, where dyscalculia 
does not have a clear definition and is describable only in terms of how the 
learner acts, we do not add any information while saying that his poor per-
formance is “due to dyscalculia”. Since our diagnoses may impact the 
learners’ lives, this kind of reasoning is a luxury we cannot afford.  
4. Some implications for educational research and practice  
Implications for research in mathematics education  
The ramifications for educational research are quite obvious. First, we 
should look at past studies critically, staying alert to the danger of being 
misled by the MofOs with which the resulting literature is replete. Second, 
in any new research, we should eschew objectifications as much as we can. 
And if our discourse cannot be hermetically closed to new objects, we need 
to take precautions whenever such object is introduced. This means, above 
all, that we need to define the new notion as clearly and operationally as we 
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can, while also adding an explicit disclaimer with regard to those meta-
phorical entailments and interpretations that we wish to exclude.  
Implications for the teaching and learning of mathematics 
In this paper, a closer look at the process of objectification brought an in-
sight about arguably the greatest challenge for the learner of mathematics: 
turning processes into objects, which is an inherently circular procedure, 
with its different conditions constituting prerequisites for each other. The 
question of how to teach to overcome this difficulty requires much think-
ing. This said, one thing is pretty clear: the teacher may greatly increase the 
effectiveness of instruction just by staying aware of those special junctures 
at which the learner may be trapped in the “vicious circle” of reification. 
Another possibly helpful thing to do is supporting students in developing 
proper attitudes and realistic expectations. This can be done by exposing 
the learners’ to expert discourse on new mathematical objects before they 
are capable of full-fledged participation, and accompanying this early expe-
rience with the slogan that, according to the historian of mathematics Jour-
dain (1956), has been assisting mathematicians of the past in similar situa-
tions: “Go on, faith will come” (p. 27) 
While deliberating on how to define natural numbers, the founders of the 
axiomatic set theory Zermelo and Fraenkel could not escape the conclusion 
that these numbers originate in literally nothing: in the empty set. It is by 
turning the empty set into a set of which it is the only element, and then 
creating a new set composed of this latter set and the empty set, and so on, 
that natural numbers could be properly “ojectified”. Indeed, metaphor of 
object seems to be a magic wand for turning nothing into something. Con-
sidering how much can be done with mathematical objects such as natural 
numbers – after all, our world would not be the same without them – one 
cannot but agree that metaphors may be among the most important sources 
of our creative powers. 
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